The Political Architecture of Security in the Arctic – the Case of Norway by Vigeland Rottem, Svein
234
[start kap]Arctic Review on Law and Politics, vol. 4, 2/2013 pp. 234–254. ISSN 1891-6252
The Political Architecture of Security 
in the Arctic – the Case of Norway
Svein Vigeland Rottem
Svein Vigeland Rottem, Senior Research Fellow, Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Norway. 
His research interests focus on two areas: climate change and adaptation and security 
issues in the Arctic. E-mail: svr@fni.no
Received December 2012, Accepted May 2013
Abstract: With receding sea ice, a new reality is taking hold in the Arctic. The 
purpose of this article is to explore Norway’s defense and security challenges in the 
region in light of this development. We argue for a broader analysis of the param-
eters of security policy. Although the article makes analytical distinction between 
security at the regional, national, and international level, these various categories 
do not exist in isolation but are used here for discussion purposes only. It is argued 
that there is a good chance of a civilized Arctic in the future, and softer national 
security challenges are then more likely to take precedence. However, interna-
tional and regional security and defence interests will continue to be important.
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Introduction
Many observers have formed the belief that the Arctic is facing radical transfor-
mation. With receding sea ice in the Arctic Ocean, a new reality is taking hold.1 
1. Climate change is not the only engine of change in the Arctic. It might be prudent to recall 
Professor Lawson Brigham’s argument: “(…) the transformation in how humans use the Arctic 
hinterlands is being driven as much by global economics and natural resource availability 
as it is by climate change”. Brigham, Lawson, “Think Again: The Arctic” in Foreign Policy, 
October/November (2010). The changing climate is nonetheless an essential aspect of any 
analysis of the Arctic’s future.
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Human activity will increase, and natural resources become more easily acces-
sible.2 New possibilities will open up. But alongside the burgeoning commercial 
activity there is a compendium of security issues to be addressed. Changes will 
affect the type of military footprint we will be seeing in the region. At the same 
time the concept of security has widened.3 While governments have reduced threat 
levels for territorial invasion, they are having to deal with new security challenges 
including humanitarian disasters, major accidents, environmental degradation, 
and international terrorism.
The purpose of this article is to explore Norway’s security and defence chal-
lenges in the Arctic,4 recognizing that Norway is a small player in international 
relations, but has an important role in what has been called the “great game” in 
the Arctic. One of the main theses of this article concerns the need for a broader 
analysis of the political architecture of security in the Arctic, looking at the re-
gional, national and international level. This does not mean to imply that the dif-
ferent levels exist in isolation with no mutual influence. We argue we should move 
beyond the two major political philosophical discourses competing in the Arctic 
at this stage, which Oran Young labels the “discourse of geopolitics/political real-
ism” and the “discourse of ecosystem-based management”.5 It will be argued that 
broader national security and safety issues are the most important as far as eve-
ryday operations in the High North6 are concerned at the present time, although 
we must not ignore the international and regional security questions.
2. Several books on the subject have been published, see for example Seidler, Christian, Arktisches 
Monopoly, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, München 2009; Howard, Robert, The Arctic Gold Rush, 
Continuum, London 2009; Sale, Richard & Potapov, Eugene, The Scramble for the Arctic, 
Frances Lincoln Ltd., London 2010; Fairhall, David, Cold Front: conflict ahead in Arctic wa-
ters, I.B. Tauris.Fairhall, London 2010; and Kraska, James (ed.) Arctic Security in an Age of 
Climate Change, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2011.
3. For an excellent overview on the development of security studies, see Buzan, Barry & Hansen, 
Lene, The Evolution of International Security Studies, Cambridge University Press, New York 
2009.
4. “Arctic” has numerous definitions: areas with an average temperature of under 10 degrees 
Celsius for every month of the year and the area north of the Arctic Circle. Hoel, Alf Håkon, 
“Do we need a new legal regime for the Arctic Ocean?” in International Journal of Marine 
and Coastal Law, Vol. 24, No.2 2009 pp. 443–456, 444. For the purposes of the arguments 
here, an exact definition is not essential, and unless stated otherwise, Arctic will be referred 
to as the area north of the Arctic Circle, though there will be a particular focus on areas in 
Norway’s vicinity.
5. Young, O., “The Arctic in Play: Governance in a Time of Rapid Change” in The International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, Vol. 24, No. 2, 2009 pp. 423–442: 432.
6. High North here defined as the Arctic area in Norway’s vicinity.
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With regard to the philosophy of politics, we should make use of insights from 
several theoretical schools to put together a portfolio of concepts relevant at the 
different levels, hence endorsing a type of theoretic eclecticism, or as David Lake 
states when addressing the status of International Relations: “Today, no single theo-
retical or epistemological approach deserves hegemony… Let’s end the theological 
crusades and seek progress in understanding real problems of world politics”.7 The 
next section is devoted to a presentation of the three political levels (international, 
regional, national) exerting influence on Arctic security. In the last section security 
challenges facing policy-makers in Norway are reviewed in light of these points.8
International security
Realism is a philosophical approach to international politics which holds that 
states are primarily concerned with self-preservation and gaining competitive 
advantage. In the eyes of realists the international security system exists in a tense 
state of virtual anarchy9 in which states as the central players are preoccupied with 
maximizing their own security and power. In this situation, to use Mearsheimer’s 
words, “[h]opes for peace will probably not be realized, because the great powers 
that shape the international system fear each other and compete for power as a 
result.”10 Extrapolating from this kind of thinking, the risk and fear of military 
conflict will naturally remain a hallmark of international relations. The struggle 
for security in which states everywhere are involved is for relative gain.11 Mistrust 
and the constant potential for conflict characterise the international system. “This 
cycle of violence,” John Mearsheimer suggests, “will continue far into the new 
millennium”.12 Indeed, as Stephen Walt reminds us, “organized violence has been 
7. Keynote address at the ISA-West Annual Conference, Los Angeles, 2010. Later published in 
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 55, 2011 pp. 465–480.
8. Empirical data consist of written primary sources (budgets, speeches, articles, white papers, 
etc.) and secondary sources (scientific reports and articles, and so on).
9. Waltz, Kenneth, Theory of International Politics, McGraw-Hill, New York 1979.
10. Mearsheimer, John J., The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, W.W Norton & Company, New 
York 2001 xi.
11. Inasmuch as states seek absolute gains, they will focus on maximizing the utility of a specific 
alliance or partnership, this notwithstanding the desire of the ally or partner to see a greater 
return for having joined the alliance or partnership. If a player takes part in a concerted action 
under the assumption that the other parties should not benefit more, one would be dealing 
with relative gains.
12. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, xi.
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a central part of human existence for millennia and is likely to remain so for the 
foreseeable future”.13 
Unfortunately there is no truly peaceful international arena, so realism can (and 
should) be used as a critical perspective to review security options, including se-
curity in the Arctic. States often behave as realists predict, meaning realism is an 
ideational framework with consistency. It can be used as an interpretative device 
to define various logics or types of reasoning inherent in international relations, or 
in this case as they pertain to the Arctic. More specifically we can say that realism 
characterizes the motivations of international power structures that control devel-
opments on a global scale. We find ourselves here, then, at the international level.
Assuming players in the Arctic take a realist view of developments in the region, 
states will act to ensure their own security and safeguard their interests. They will 
mistrust the motives of others, employ military options if it serves their purposes, 
and give precedence to classic security assessments. The question we need to ask 
ourselves is how the different players in the region will assess the balance between 
political gains and military risk in a conflict scenario in the Arctic. In terms of 
military strategy alone, the area, it could be said, is of signal importance. It was 
crucial in Soviet and U.S. Cold War defence planning,14 though in the current 
situation with the U.S. in a (somewhat contested) position of world leadership 
and Russia no longer the counterweight to the U.S. and NATO, relying solely on 
a military strategist approach would seem contrived. The danger of conflict has 
not dissipated altogether, but in terms of international power politics, the region 
is less important nowadays than in the days of the Cold War.
However, in comparison with the 1990s, Arctic security is now an important 
topic. We have seen heated exchanges, particularly from Canada and Russia, and 
certainly there has been a rise in military activity in the region15 which could lead 
to a security dilemma16 – a situation in which, for example, mounting Russian 
activity persuades Washington to launch a response based on the notion that it’s 
better to be safe than sorry, or give as good as one gets. This in turn could unleash 
a Russian counter move, with the risk that both parties would join an arms race. 
13. Walt, Stephen, “The Renaissance of Security Studies” in International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 
35, No.2 1991 pp. 211–239.
14. For a closer examination of this period in Norwegian politics, see Tamnes, Rolf, Norsk uten-
rikspolitisk historie. Oljealder 1965–1995, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo 1997.
15. Kraska (ed.) Arctic Security in an Age of Climate Change.
16. Herz, John, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma” in World Politics, Vol.2, 
No.2 1950, pp. 157–180.
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But judging from the level of military activity in the region today and how the 
Arctic is portrayed in Arctic capitals, this possibility is remote.17
Despite low military tension in the region there is always a risk, according to 
several commentators, of the escalating use of force. It is important to keep in 
mind that according to the realist tradition, conflict does not necessarily arise 
because states want it, but rather due to clashes of interest. Geopolitical changes 
could make the Arctic strategically important and require broader geostrategic 
analysis. China’s growing interest in the region is worth noting in that respect, as 
it is becoming an ever more pivotal power on the world stage and wants to play 
a role in the Arctic.18 Given its reliance on imports, and not least for energy pur-
poses, China keeps at least one eye on the Arctic.19 The search for stable, reliable 
sources of energy is a key national concern and in that context potential Arctic 
energy resources20 will obviously be an important component.
So while we are unlikely to see a major build-up of arms in the region (see below 
as well), the Arctic is still important in terms of international security. Disputes 
over limited resources and enforcement of jurisdiction are key components in the 
Realpolitik logic of international relations and one could assume a military dimen-
sion. Tensions could imperil the responsible stewardship of resources in the area 
and complicate maritime activity. If we study Arctic issues through a realist lens, 
we must ask whether the players, especially the five states bordering the Arctic 
Ocean, would be willing to contemplate military action to win a minor “battle”.21 
The military risk would be considerable and the political return frequently mar-
ginal.22 The reduced strategic importance of the Arctic and the players’ need for 
17. Id.
18. Jakobsen, Linda, “China Prepares For An Ice-Free Arctic” in SIPRI Insights on Peace and 
Security, No. 2010/2.
19. The High North is attracting the attention of other players as well, including South Korea, 
Japan and the EU, a matter that has spawned numerous analyses, among them the research 
project Geopolitics in the High North (see www.geopoliticsnorth.org) and the research pro-
ject on Asian Countries’ Interest in the Arctic coordinated by the Fridtjof Nansen Institute 
(http://www.fni.no/news/120706.html).
20. USGS 2008 is a standard reference for estimates of new oil and gas reserves. The Government 
relies on the United States Geological Survey assessment when it suggests that 25 per cent 
of the world’s undiscovered oil and gas reserves could be in the Arctic (Government White 
Paper No. 15, 2008–2009). Several commentators have criticized the figures, nevertheless, e.g. 
Offerdal, Kristine, “Arctic energy in EU policy: arbitrary interests in the Norwegian High 
North” in Arctic, Vol. 63 No.1 2010, pp. 30–42.
21. The five states are the U.S., Russia, Canada, Denmark and Norway.
22. Diesen, Sverre, “New Perspectives on Military Power in the Arctic”. Speech by former Chief 
of Defense Sverre Diesen, Tromsø 25 September 2007.
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a stable environment for their commercial activities underpin this conclusion. 
Uncertainty about the state of the climate23 lends this reasoning further support. 
So although we live in a brutal world, and it will likely remain so for the foreseeable 
future according to the logic of realism, the chances of sustained military hostili-
ties in the Arctic region are relatively small. The danger of conflict is not absent 
altogether, however, as John Mearsheimer reminds us in the passage quoted above.
Regional cooperation
Regional cooperation is a key feature in the “new” Arctic. Mutual dependency has 
facilitated a shared realization that cooperation is the best option in the face of a 
given challenge.24 There are a wide range of examples of cooperative mechanisms 
in the Arctic in the fields of transportation, oil and gas, and fisheries. And in the 
words of Oran Young one should “(…) devise cooperative regimes that make it pos-
sible to address inter-related Arctic issues in an integrated manner”.25 On the other 
hand, close interdependence can sow the seeds of hostilities to come in the sense 
of encouraging awareness of one’s interests in a particular sector. Nevertheless 
one of the vital premises underpinning alliances of this type is the idea of abso-
lute gain. This is particularly relevant since we are concerned with international 
legal regimes, including bilateral forms of cooperation on Arctic-related issues, at 
both the regional and international level. However, potential security threats that 
originate at the regional level are the focus of this article.
The institutions of (regional) cooperation in the Arctic act according to a liberal 
logic, in itself an aid to dampen disputes. Mutual economic dependence raises the 
conflict threshold. In this situation, climate change in the Arctic may not neces-
sarily increase threat levels and may indeed have the opposite effect, enhancing 
peace. There are several examples in the region of successful management regimes 
involving both Russia and Norway. The more than thirty-year-old Norwegian–
Russian Barents Sea fisheries management organization is frequently cited as a 
successful venture.26 It shows what can be gained by working together. The Barents 
23. Recent years have seen polar ice retreat, though ice coverage has varied widely year-on-year 
and within a given season. The National Ice Center (http://www.natice.noaa.gov/) is a useful 
source of ice coverage records.
24. Keohane, Robert O. & Nye, Joseph S., Power and interdependence: World politics in transition, 
Little, Brown and Company, Boston 1977.
25. Young, The Arctic in Play: Governance in a Time of Rapid Change, p. 432.
26. Hønneland, Geir, Kvotekamp og kystsolidaritet. Norsk-russisk fiskeriforvaltning gjennom 30 
år, Fagbokforlaget, Bergen 2006. Hønneland, Geir, Making Fishery Agreements Work: Post-
Agreement Bargaining in the Barents Sea, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham/Northampton 2012.
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Euro-Arctic Council and Arctic Council are two other successful institutions. All 
the same, the remit of these institutions does not extend to classic security issues. 
Achieving formal collaboration on defence and security is harder than promoting 
economic integration, which falls into the category of “low politics”,27 or politics 
minus national defence. However, the main point is that mutual recognition of 
shared challenges mitigates conflict, as do the interests of the opposite number 
and their right to safeguard them.
An approach such as this to the study of challenges and possibilities in the High 
North is relevant in any analysis of commercial and maritime operations in the 
region. A viable commercial extraction of oil and gas requires intergovernmental 
cooperation, and even more so in a region where the climate and natural condi-
tions are as demanding as those found in the Arctic. It falls to the development of 
technology to produce resources in a given field, the Shtokman field being a notable 
example, as well as in the transportation of oil and gas. The previous involvement 
of Statoil and Total in the possible development of the Shtokman field tells us that 
Russia (Gazprom) is conscious of the need for outside expertise to exploit national 
resources.28 If we assume that states with interests in the Arctic act rationally more 
often than not, a stable regional operating environment would obviously be a top 
priority. Political tensions and threats to security could undermine the commer-
cially viable production of oil and gas in the region.29 The economic argument 
would probably (and hopefully) carry weight. It should also be noted that most of 
the oil and gas reserves in the Arctic are within the individual states’ undisputed 
territorial borders or jurisdiction.30 Violation of these ground rules in international 
politics would be both politically and militarily costly. In other words, we are un-
likely to see disputes over ownership rights to these resources.
The international legal architecture pertaining to the Arctic deserves attention 
in discussion of the potential for regional conflict and/or cooperation. The Arctic 
states appear to have agreed a set of ground rules. This does not eliminate the pos-
sibility of conflict, but an analysis of the architecture should be a central compo-
nent of a security analysis. We need to look beyond the purely material, economic 
and climatic developments in the Arctic and seek a more complete and coherent 
27. “Low politics” is defined as politics minus classic security issues such as national defence.
28. Moe, Arild, “The Russian Barents Sea: Openings for Norway?” in Gottemoeller, R. & Tamnes, 
R. (eds.), High North: High Stakes. Fagbokforlaget, Bergen 2008, pp. 75–85.
29. But as the joint Norwegian–Russian fisheries management scheme shows, cooperation is pos-
sible despite extremely strained relations in the area of security.
30. Holtsmark, Sven G. & Smith-Windsor, Brooke A. (eds.), Security Prospects in the High North: 
geostrategic thaw or freeze? NATO Defense College, Rome 2009.
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picture of the region.31 An important but alas often neglected insight is that border 
issues in the Arctic follow a certain pattern.32 The rights and duties of the Arctic 
states are laid down in international law, the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (LOS) being the leading document in this area. The Arctic states 
are obliged to comply with the international legal framework, of which LOS is a 
part.33 The LOS also directs coastal states to work together to manage fish stocks 
that migrate across economic zones.
At the time of writing the LOS has been ratified by 165 states. Of the Arctic 
states only the United States has not ratified it, although this does not mean that 
the superpower will violate the principles of the convention. In May 2008, the 
small Greenland town of Ilulissat hosted a meeting of the five states bordering the 
Arctic Ocean. In the declaration issued following the meeting, they expressed a 
common regional desire to have legal regimes regulate activity in the region, and 
pointed specifically to the LOS: “The law of the sea provides for important rights 
and obligations concerning the delineation of the outer limits of the continental 
shelf, the protection of the marine environment, including ice-covered areas, free-
dom of navigation, marine scientific research and other uses of the sea” and the 
affected states will “remain committed to this legal framework and to the orderly 
settlement of any possible overlapping claim.”34 The Ilulissat Declaration expressed 
a common desire to establish how the “new” Arctic should be regulated. Both the 
declaration and the later meeting at Chelsea in Canada in 2010 35 articulated an 
aspiration to settle unresolved jurisdictional issues without the use of force. States 
bordering the Arctic Ocean will therefore most likely behave in accordance with 
the legal environment.36 So, contrary to the impression sometimes created by gov-
ernmental and tabloid accounts of what the Arctic will be like in the future, we 
are not approaching complete anarchy in the region.
31. Jensen, Øystein & Rottem, Svein Vigeland, “The Politics of Security and International Law in 
Norway’s Arctic Waters” in Polar Record, Vol. 46, No. 1, 2010, pp. 75–83.
32. In global terms there are not many maritime borders to draw in the Arctic. See Hoel, Alf 
Hakon, “Do we need a new legal regime for the Arctic Ocean?”.
33. Jensen & Rottem, “The Politics of Security and International Law in Norway’s Arctic Waters”.
34. Ilulissat Declaration. 2008. Available at http://uk.nanoq.gl/Emner/News/News_from_
Parliament/2008/05/~/media/66562304FA464945BB621411BFFB6E12.ashx.
35. For the Norwegian Government’s account of the meeting, see http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/
dep/ud/aktuelt/taler_artikler/utenriksministeren/2010/kyststat_ottawa.html?id=604669
36. The role of the UNCLOS as a stability-enhancing mechanism could however be problematic. 
States do have different interpretations of this framework. The fact that it took Norway and 
Russia 40 years to make a compromise on delimitation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean 
is evidence of that.
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National coordination
If we turn to the national level security challenges, we need to ground our theoreti-
cal toolbox more on institutional approaches, and look closely at the most promi-
nent security actor, namely the Norwegian Armed Forces. The changed concept of 
total defence37 requires the Armed Forces to bring their expertise, capacities and 
resources to bear in support of civil authorities and their response to a crisis of 
any description.38 The Armed Forces must work to ensure Norway’s security, save 
lives, limit the impact of accidents, disasters, and strikes and attacks by state and 
non-state belligerents.39 Because higher activity levels in the Arctic could give rise 
to several new security and safety challenges, it is necessary to analyze the wider 
role of the Armed Forces in that light. As the concept of security evolves, military 
players will assume new tasks, often at the intersection of civil society and the ser-
vices, and usually at the national level.40 This includes limiting the consequences 
of oil spills and involvement in search and rescue missions. Unmistakably such 
challenges are also addressed through international and regional cooperation. 
However, the direct impact and response is at the national level, and thus in the 
margins of the international and regional security system.
If we widen our conception of what security policy is all about, important key 
words that spring to mind are surveillance, and search and rescue. Without good 
working relations between civilian authorities and the military, an efficient search 
and rescue capacity in the region would be impossible.41 And with mounting ac-
tivity and a changing climatic environment, questions like these will necessarily 
gain momentum. We can further distinguish between protection from intentional 
and unintentional acts and incidents. Classic security concerns such as invasion 
and acts of terrorism come under the rubric of intentional acts, while oil spills 
caused by aviation or shipping accidents exemplify the second. We should refer 
to the latter as “soft” security or safety issues. With regard to the operative han-
37. The Government Proposal on the modernization of the Norwegian armed forces in the period 
2005–2008 examines the concept of total defence in more detail (Government Proposal No. 
42, 2003-–2004).
38. Government Proposal No. 48, 2007–2008, p. 53.
39. Id. at p. 51.
40. The Norwegian Armed Forces have always had a role in defence of society, but the repertoire 
of tasks could be widened given increased activity in the Arctic.
41. When it comes to establishing joint procedures for search and rescue missions in the Arctic, 
the Arctic Council is a key institution, as indeed the 2011 Agreement on Cooperation on 
Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic recognizes (the SAR Agreement), 
see http://arctic-council.npolar.no/accms/export/sites/default/en/meetings/2011-nuuk-min-
isterial/docs/Arctic_SAR_Agreement_EN_FINAL_for_signature_21-Apr-2011.pdf
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dling of these challenges, we are essentially dealing with national level operations 
inasmuch as safety issues require a broad range of national capacities, even when 
other countries are involved. What distinguishes the national from the regional 
and international level is that, given for example an accident with an oil tanker 
on the coast of Northern Norway, the direct local impact could be enormous, al-
though such a catastrophe would only indirectly affect other states.
The response to accidents at sea is very important to shipping. The Danish Arctic 
debate has tended to centre on the risk of cruise ships sailing off Greenland,42 – for 
instance, what would happen if a calving iceberg created a mammoth wave close 
to a cruise ship carrying 3,000 tourists? Scenarios of horrific events like this are 
also about safety issues. Do we have the resources to deal with an event of this 
magnitude? The answer is unfortunately not. Nonetheless, much of the work on 
contingency planning in the Arctic involves the evolving climatic situation, that is, 
precisely these types of issues. On the other hand, participants in the public debate 
don’t seem to be keeping up. Obviously, in a world of tabloid sound bites, the big 
security questions in the Arctic have a marketable potential. Are we heading for 
a new Cold War? But the pertinent question should be how we intend to avert or 
deal with an accident comparable to the Exxon Valdez disaster43 or an accident 
involving a gigantic cruise ship. All the same, the possibility of achieving a joint 
regional system and common set of international regulations44 in these areas is 
relatively high they are not as such subsumed under a classic approach to security. 
But distances in the Arctic are enormous and infrastructure is lacking. The 
Arctic covers a sixth of the world’s surface with its 30 million square kilometres. At 
the same time, the region holds 4 million inhabitants. So we are talking about enor-
mous distances and a highly dispersed population. Any discussion of security in the 
Arctic needs to acknowledge these geographical and logistical facts. In a security 
perspective like this, the diversity of players at the national level increases as well. 
Relations between and efforts to coordinate the action of various organizations with 
different structures and cultures constitutes in that sense a central field of study.
While national, regional and international security/safety issues are intercon-
nected, the rationale for the security differs. At the international level, a realist 
42. For the Danish Arctic strategy, see http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/
Politics-and-diplomacy/Arktis_Rapport_UK_210x270_Final_Web.ashx
43. On 24 March 1989, the oil tanker Exxon Valdez ran aground in Prince William Sound off 
the coast of Alaska. The accident and succeeding oil spillage were one of the most destructive 
man-made environmental disasters at sea ever. The local populace is still struggling with the 
consequences of the catastrophe.
44. The work of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) is relevant in this respect, see 
http://www.imo.org/Pages/home.aspx
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interpretation often predominates. In the more limited regional context we note 
mutual inter-dependency, and at the national level, a number of challenges in the 
wake of increased commercial activity needs to be addressed, including harmo-
nization and coordination. As suggested above, there is little evidence that inter-
national security questions – which are usually clothed in the language of real-
ism – affect everyday operations in the Far North. We should therefore broaden 
our security analysis 45 to include regional cooperation mechanisms and safety-
related challenges with a national focus. We can now put these ideas into effect in 
a Norwegian context.
Norway in the Arctic
On April 15, 2009, Norway’s foreign minister Jonas Gahr Støre held a much-antic-
ipated press conference. He was in a good frame of mind because the Commission 
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) had just submitted its final recom-
mendations on the Norwegian shelf. Norway has sovereign rights over whatever 
lies beneath the seabed in an area of 235,000 square kilometers. This is in addition 
to the 200 nautical-mile shelf.46 Thanks to developments in the international law 
of the sea, Norway is today a significant maritime state holding an area that is six 
times as large as Norway’s land mass. In consequence, Norway needs to maintain 
a visible presence, uphold its sovereign rights and survey and monitor these areas.
The High North is Norway’s principal foreign policy concern. The Government’s 
long-term plan for the Armed Forces, issued in 2012,47 and its comprehensive white 
paper on Norway’s foreign policy,48 both describe the High North as Norway’s most 
important strategic focus. The Far North has thus acquired a political urgency 
not seen since the Cold War. The political work resulting in such a comprehen-
sive strategy has a fairly long history. In March 2003 the Norwegian foreign office 
appointed a task force addressing High North issues. It submitted its report in 
45. The theoretical portfolio could also have been broader. We could have for example drawn on 
insights within securitisation theory (Buzan, Barry; Wæver, Ole & Wilde, Jaap d., Security: A 
New Framework For Analysis, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London 1998; and regional security 
complex theory (Buzan, Barry, Peoples, States and Fear, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hertfordshire 
1991; Buzan, Barry & Wæver, Ole, Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003. The main point is that when we apply theory 
to understand the wider security agenda in the Arctic we should do so from an eclectic and 
pragmatic baseline.
46. For a more detailed account, see http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/press/news/2009/
shelf_clarified.html?id=554718.
47. Government Proposal No. 73, 2011–2012.
48. White Paper No. 15, 2008–2009.
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December 2003 entitled “Mot nord!”49 April 2005 saw the release of another white 
paper dealing with the possibilities and challenges in the Far North.50 But it was 
the red–green coalition Government that came to power in the autumn of 2005 
that gave the High North the precedence it has today. Policy documents such as 
the Soria Moria Declaration of 2005 and 2009, as well as the Government’s High 
North Strategy51 outline the challenges and possibilities in the Far North. Given 
the changing climatic conditions, not least the retreat of the sea ice, commercial 
and economic activity is expected to rise in the region. These documents also 
describe climatic changes and adaptation to them as a Government priority. In 
the Government’s words, the “(…) High North efforts are intended to enhance 
Norway’s ability to exercise sovereignty and promote sustainable management 
(…)”.52 Defence ministry documents display much of the same rhetorical style as 
those from the foreign office. The proposed long-term plan for the Armed Forces, 
2012–2016 emphasizes the “great importance of having the Armed Forces in place 
and operating in the High North”.53 According to the Strategic Concept, “the safe-
guarding of our sovereignty, territorial integrity and political freedom is a fun-
damental security interest, an interest which finds particular expression through 
Norway’s undertakings in the High North”.54 Climate change in the region and 
its consequences for Norway are thus at the top of the political agenda, and are 
strategically relevant to various cooperative mechanisms. This strategic interest is 
apparent not least in Norway’s relations with Russia, in the management of marine 
resources and of the Barents Sea as a strategically important area in terms of oil 
and gas reserves and shipping.
Power politics and its environment
When opening the new operational HQ for the Armed Forces at Reitan, outside 
Bodø, August. 1 2009, then defence minister Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen said 
“a presence in the North is of vital importance for the Armed Forces”.55 While 
one could construe the establishment of the headquarters as a militarization of 
49. “Look North!” – Official Norwegian Report No. 32, 2003.
50. Government White Paper No. 30, 2004–2005.
51. Government High North Strategy (2006), Government High North Strategy (2009).
52. Government 2009, p. 6.
53. Government Proposal No. 73, 2011–2012: p. 31.
54. Norwegian Strategic Concept, 2009, p. 26.
55. Commentary article by Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen, “God forsvarspolitikk å flytte FOH til 
Reitan”, 7. August 2009http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fd/aktuelt/taler_artikler/ministeren/
forsvarsminister-stroem-erichsen/2009/god-forsvarspolitikk-a-flytte-foh-til-re.html?id=573326.
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the region that was certainly not the intention, according to political sources. 
Nevertheless, it shows that military presence in the region is politically important. 
If we look at the focus on the Navy (including the Coast Guard), and the political 
talk on the nation’s engagement in the region, Norway comes across as a more ac-
tive military player in Northern waters. Whether practice mirrors talk is all the 
same more of an open question. However, given the scope of the present article, 
this question will not be examined further.
Russian military activity has increased of late. There have been naval exercises 
in the region, and strategic bomber flights along the Norwegian coast have been 
resumed. Russian rhetoric on Arctic questions is at times quite heated.56 However, 
according to the official line from Oslo, we should take care not to see Russia’s mili-
tary activity as an expression of pressure on Norway’s interests.57 It could be said 
that we are reverting to a “state of normality”. These bomber sorties were a distin-
guishing feature of the Cold War.58 The 1990s, on the other hand, were peaceful in 
comparison. There are several reasons why Russia would want to increase activity. 
The most important is probably that Russia can afford to showcase its great power 
ambitions. The flights, in that sense, are part of a normal behavioural pattern for 
a great power. They are intrinsic to the geopolitical and Realpolitik reality. But it 
was then, and remains today, important for Norway to show it is “on the ball”, so 
to speak, and F-16 fighter planes have been on the wing.59
This military activity is an indicator of the region’s geopolitical importance. 
Geopolitics can be described as the doctrine of international politics’ interaction 
with geographical and resource-related factors.60 Several analyses from Nordic 
scholars use the doctrine as their starting point.61 Norway’s geographical location, 
its relatively mild climate and rich resources have attracted attention. Norway 
lies within a trilateral system of power politics; it is a small NATO ally border-
56. Zysk, Katarina, “Russian Military Power and the Arctic” in EU–Russia Centre’s Review VIII – 
Russian Foreign Policy. EU–Russia Centre, Brussels, October 2008. Zysk, Katarina, “Russia’s 
Arctic Strategy: Ambitions and Constraints” in Joint Force Quarterly, Vol. 57, No. 2, 2010 pp. 
103–110.
57. Government Proposal No. 48, 2007–2008.
58. Tamnes, Rolf, The United States and the Cold War in the High North, Dartmouth, Aldershot 
1991.
59. Government Proposal No. 1, 2008–2009.
60. The term was coined in the early twentieth century by the Swedish political scientist Rudolf 
Kjellén.
61. Neumann, Iver B., “Norges handlingsrom og behovet for en overgripende sikkerhetspolitisk 
strategi.” in Det sikkerhetspolitiske bibliotek, Vol.3, No. 9, 2002, pp. 3–21. Tunander, Ola, 
“Geopolitics of the north: geopolitik of the weak” in Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 43, No. 
2, 2008, pp. 164–184.
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ing Russia by land and by sea. The transatlantic dimension, continental Europe, 
and Russia, make up the system’s three apices. But defining Norway’s room for 
manoeuvre on the basis of this tripartite system would be unnecessarily limiting. 
It would be more correct to describe Norway as a part of a square or pentagon of 
influences.62 China’s rise as a great power in economic and military terms, along 
with a tense Middle East, also informs Norway’s security policy. Norwegian secu-
rity thinking on the Northern seas reflects this global reality. It is not intended here 
to analyse in detail the factors underlying Norway’s security options, but rather to 
point out that the global balance of power forms the context in which Norwegian 
foreign policy on the High North is made. If the balance of power within these 
structures were to change it could affect the terms on which High North policy is 
based. International power structures are therefore a decisive component of any 
analysis of security policy, and therefore for Norway in the Arctic.
If, for example, Russia became overassertive, the role and stance of the NATO 
alliance would be crucial.63 Were a military confrontation to take place in the Far 
North, Norway would depend on allied support. It is therefore pertinent to ask 
whether NATO has its eyes on the Far North. NATO’s strategic concept defines 
its position and its role. In the work to develop the strategic concept anno 2010, 
Norway proposed what in Norwegian is called the “nærområdeinitiativet” (core 
area initiative) with a view to encouraging the alliance to address security in and 
around NATO member countries.64
Moreover, former Chief of Defence Sverre Diesen urged Norway to take greater 
national responsibility for security in the High North. Because NATO members 
do not face a common existential threat any more, he says, the “substance of the 
collective security guarantee” may suffer.65 Norway should not expect the alliance 
to come running in the event of a crisis in the North. It is the scale and nature of 
the crisis that will define NATO’s role. Regional security challenges might not spill 
over to the international level. Changes in the international power structure have 
a bearing therefore on Norway’s security in the Arctic. As noted above, however, 
62. Jensen & Rottem, “The Politics of Security and International Law in Norway’s Arctic Waters”.
63. For an overview on NATO engagement in the Arctic, see Haftendorn, Helga, “NATO and 
the Arctic: is the Atlantic alliance a cold war relic in a peaceful region now faced with non-
military challenges?” in European Security, vol. 20, no. 3, 2011, pp. 337–361.
64. Government Proposal No. 1, 2009–2010, p. 98.
65. Diesen, Sverre, “Hvorfor nordisk forsvarssamarbeid?” Commentary article in Aftenposten 
12.01.2009. http://www.mil.no/fst/forsvarssjefen/start/article.jhtml?articleID=171265.
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such changes have actually lessened tensions in the region, as the Government’s 
last long-term defence plans recognise.66
Regional challenges
Turning to challenges of a more regional nature in the Far North, there is little 
chance that management issues in the Barents Sea will escalate into a military 
showdown between Norway and Russia (the two principal players in the region). 
Naturally, military options cannot be ruled out as a foreign policy mechanism, 
such as using military presence to demonstrate ownership of certain resources. But 
from a realist perspective, where benefits are weighed against risks, a scenario with 
an escalating use of force is not very likely. An armed Russian attack on Norwegian 
territory because of disagreement over the management of fish stocks, for exam-
ple, is unrealistic. A more conceivable response would be to use foreign policy and 
diplomatic channels to resolve this kind of conflict of interest. This takes us to the 
regional and bilateral level. The signing on 15 September 2010 in Murmansk of the 
Russian–Norwegian Maritime Delimitation Treaty is a good example of regional 
and bilateral cooperation.67 That is why it is difficult to see how and why an Arctic 
state would want to mount a major military offensive simply for the sake of certain 
preferences regarding a management strategy, and especially in an environment 
of mutual interdependence.
Nevertheless, a clash over oil and gas reserves might well be a less inviting pros-
pect. Reliable, predictable energy supplies are crucial to state security.68 Norway’s 
rather unique position as a small state and a major energy producer is germane 
in this regard. And one of the key questions here concerns the size of the oil and 
gas reserves in the Barents Sea. According to some experts, the Arctic may hold as 
much as a quarter of the world’s undiscovered reserves. Participants in debates in 
Norway and sometimes internationally evidently believe that the Barents Sea could 
become a crucial source of Europe’s energy in the future. As a 2007 Newsweek 
article predicted, for example, “Today [the Barents Sea is] set to become Europe’s 
energy Klondike, a last untapped pool of natural resources”.69 This is an opinion 
that needs slight modification. Seen through Norwegian eyes, we need to recognize 
66. Government Proposal No. 42, 2003–2004, Government Proposal No. 48, 2007–2008, 
Government Proposal No. 73, 2011–2012.
67. The treaty can be accessed here: http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Folkerett/
avtale_engelsk.pdf.
68. Yergin, David, “Ensuring Energy Security” in Foreign Affairs. Vol. 85 No. 2, 2006, pp. 69–82.
69. Underhill, William, “Norwegian gold” in Newsweek, 8. January 2007. http://www.newsweek.
com/2007/01/07/norwegian-gold.html.
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that most of the resources are in the Russian part of the Barents Sea. There are 
reserves in Norway’s half too, but they can’t be compared to the amounts on the 
Russian side.70 There are, nevertheless, large undiscovered reserves of oil and gas 
on the Norwegian shelf in the Barents Sea, according to the Ministry of Oil and 
Energy.71 These undiscovered reserves will obviously be important for an oil and 
gas nation like Norway, but whether other states would be ready to use military 
force to gain access to them is another question, cf. arguments above. However, 
unconventional gas, specifically shale gas, and unconventional oil is gaining global 
interest, and has the potential to provide a new source of domestic production, as 
has happened in the U.S. This again could change the “game of energy”. Thus the 
potential for Arctic oil and gas must be analysed in a global context.
Another regional challenge with implications for security is the Svalbard is-
sue. One could argue that a key security challenge for Norway in the Far North 
both in the traditional and wider sense – apart from relations with its next-door 
neighbour, Russia – is Svalbard. Svalbard is interesting because of its geostrategic 
importance, especially in light of growing maritime traffic along Arctic routes, but 
also with regard to fish stocks and possible oil and gas reserves. The Svalbard Treaty 
gives Norway “full and absolute sovereignty of Norway over the Archipelago of 
Spitsbergen.” Norwegian sovereignty thus extends to and includes Svalbard. 
Nevertheless, all is not clear. There is no agreement on which management re-
gime should apply to waters and the continental shelf around the archipelago. 
In the words of the Treaty, “All the High Contracting Parties, shall enjoy equally 
the rights of fishing and hunting”72 in the territories and territorial waters. The 
Svalbard Treaty’s equal treatment provisions do not, in the view of the Norwegian 
Government, apply to the continental shelf and the economic zone around the 
area in question. Some, however, disagree with the Government’s interpretation 
on this point.73 Norway has therefore chosen to establish a fishery protection zone 
around Svalbard as a temporary measure, a regime which so far has been quite 
successful. Problems could arise, however, if oil and gas were found in quantity 
70. USGS World Petroleum Assessment 2008.http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/fs2008–3049.pdf.
71. See http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/oed/tema/olje_og_gass/Olje-og-gass-i-nordomradene.
html?id=446933.
72. LOV 1920–02–09 nr 00: Traktat mellem Norge, Amerikas Forente Stater, Danmark, Frankrike, 
Italia, Japan, Nederlandene, Storbritannia og Irland og de britiske oversjøiske besiddelser og 
Sverige angående Spitsbergen. Se, http://www.lovdata.no/all/hl-19200209–000.html.
73. The waters and shelf around the archipelago are part of the “high seas”, argue certain 
Russian commentators. See Jensen & Rottem, “The Politics of Security and International 
Law in Norway’s Arctic Waters”. For a closer analysis see Pedersen, Torbjørn, “The Svalbard 
Continental Shelf Controversy: Legal Disputes and Political Rivalries” in Ocean Development 
& International Law, vol.37, no. 3–4, 2006, pp. 339–358.
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in the vicinity of the archipelago. It could cause economic and strategic interests 
to stir, bringing greater pressure to bear on Norway’s stance. But it would also be 
in the interest of the parties to ensure proper regulation of oil and gas extraction 
around the archipelago. Without regulation it would be impossible to mine the 
resources efficiently. That wouldn’t be in anyone’s interest. It is clearly then a matter 
of national interest to proceed with the legal clarification of this regional challenge.
At the present time disputes over the current fishery management regime 
around Svalbard are unlikely to escalate. Questions like these are more likely to be 
resolved amicably. Inter-governmental disputes over the management of fish stocks 
will most likely be solved via diplomacy.74 However, reactions to Norway’s manage-
ment of fisheries around Svalbard have at times been scathing; the Chernigov case 
(2001), Elektron case (2005) and Shappire II (2011) are three examples. At the end 
of the day, we’re talking about consequences for security policy.
What makes the Svalbard question thorny is the involvement of players with 
partly compatible and partly incompatible interests.75 One would expect, on the 
basis of a military and strategic assessment, that NATO (and the member nations) 
would support Norway. That may not necessarily be the case if the dispute were 
over fish or oil and gas. The Svalbard issue is at large a regional challenge and will 
not spill over to the international level. However, one would assume that given 
increased international security tensions in the region it would affect the room for 
manoeuvre. We see here conflicting security rationales and potentially different 
“alliances” at the various levels, and regional security challenges do not neces-
sarily make it to the international level. Moreover, one could argue that common 
interests are easier to locate at the regional level, where the geographical nearness 
would make cooperation more rational and to a certain extent more tranquil.
74. There are instances all the same where the rights to extract fish resources in northern waters 
have culminated in limited military confrontation. The so-called “cod war” between Iceland 
and the UK from 1958 to 1976 is such an exception. Relations between the two NATO allies 
reached their lowest ebb between 1973 and 1976. When Iceland extended its territorial wa-
ters, a move the UK refused to recognize, coastguard vessels from the two countries clashed 
(Tamnes 1997). See also: Børresen, Jacob, Torskekrig! Om forutsetninger og rammer for kyst-
statens bruk av makt, Abstrakt Forlag, Oslo 2011.
75. Pedersen, “The Svalbard Continental Shelf Controversy: Legal Disputes and Political Rivalries.”, 
Pedersen, Torbjørn & Henriksen, Tore, “Svalbard’s Maritime Zones: The End of Legal 
Uncertainty?” in International Journal of Maritime and Coastal Law, vol. 24, no. 1, 2009, pp. 
141–161.
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Softer security
Moving down a rung on the security ladder, other challenges to do with rising ac-
tivity in the region come into view. Participants in the debate on Norway’s defence 
and security policy would do well to look more closely at what is called by some 
“soft security” issues. There are many challenges connected with surveillance, 
search and rescue, and oil spill prevention and response in polar areas. And as the 
climate changes, and technology moves forward and economic development ena-
bles commercial activity, these issues will gain political momentum. Being seen as 
a “good steward” of the environment helps enhance Norway’s security as well. At 
the same time, the Norwegian “defence model” is based on a wish to avoid waste-
ful and unnecessary duplication. The Armed Forces should have, and do have, a 
number of responsibilities at the intersection with civil society.76 Norway is a small 
state, and it is the job of the Armed Forces to gather intelligence, enforce jurisdic-
tion and be ready to meet a set of new challenges in the Far North – whether they 
are connected with search and rescue or oil spill preparedness. These capacities are 
particularly relevant in a national context, without denying integration in regional 
and international mechanisms on the basis of treaties and exercises.77 This is not, 
however, an argument for not having a military presence to uphold sovereignty and 
emphasize Norwegian rights in the Northern seas. On the other hand, the national 
defence debate has to a large extent failed to address so far the practical problems 
facing the Coast Guard service (which is also a wing of the Armed Forces) while 
patrolling waters in the Far North, for example.
There is no formula that says how much defence is enough for the Far North. 
A significant problem, all the same, is the overriding dominance in the public 
debate of the role of the Armed Forces, relations with Russia, and the wider geo-
political environment. Seen in light of a changing climate and its consequences, 
commentators on Norway’s security need to extend their purview. Changes in 
the contemporary law of the sea have given Norway marvelous opportunities and 
unrivalled access to enormous resources. But they present challenges as well. The 
largest of them is how a small country with relatively scarce resources (physical 
and human) should fulfill its stewardship of these waters and address the potential 
growth in safety challenges. For Norway, what was mentioned above is a further 
dimension, i.e. the question of its stewardship and management of the waters and 
seabed around Svalbard. The regional security challenges in this sense are also of 
76. Government Proposal No. 42, 2003–2004.
77. In the Norwegian Strategic Concept from 2009, the broadening of the security concept is evi-
dent when it refers to and distinguishes between state security, societal security and human 
security (p. 19).
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critical importance. Moreover, increasing activity will require national capacities 
to meet challenges in the field of oil spill prevention and response and rescue.
If we look to what is Norway’s primary security actor, the Armed Forces, they 
are currently operating at the tense interface with the three levels explained above. 
The prime tasks at the international level are to uphold sovereignty and maintain 
a presence.78 Regionally, there needs to be a raft of capacities designed to impress 
Norway’s ownership rights to the resources in the Far North, and the country’s 
practice of sound stewardship. Nationally, the Coast Guard (but also a number of 
other entities in the Armed Forces) is a crucial multi-capacity entity, with a role 
to play in the fields of oil spill prevention and response, and search and rescue.
Norway is a minor player in international politics. In other areas, however, 
Norway is an important player with its vast oil and gas reserves. How should 
this combination of smallness and relevance in the world of energy politics af-
fect Norway’s approach to security in Northern waters? Do these resources make 
Norway more exposed? A fundamental argument here has been that the chances 
of a major conflict are marginal. This doesn’t mean the Armed Forces are irrel-
evant, but rather that we are dealing with moving targets. Against the background 
of changing climatic conditions, among other things, Norway will have to address 
several new problems in the Arctic. The dilemma is that no one knows exactly what 
those challenges will be before they emerge. The Armed Forces have been used to 
draft contingency plans for several possible scenarios. During the Cold War, the in-
ternational balance of power defined operational strategy in the Arctic. The realist 
approach seemed to offer at the time a sensible means of deciphering the “logics of 
security”. It downplayed regional and national security. Of late, regional questions 
to do with stewardship/management and clarification of legal issues are attracting 
attention. In this setting, we can profit from liberalist insights for cooperative ac-
tion without losing sight of the security dimension. Moreover, greater activity will 
present additional challenges at the national level. Ideas drawn from institutional 
theory can help us identify relevant issues concerning, among other things, coor-
dination. What sort of role, for example, should the Armed Forces be given in this 
wider sense of security policy with regard to challenges such as oil spill prevention 
and response, and search and rescue? This is not the place here to consider the range 
of such challenges. What is crucial, though, is that different “logics of security” 
attach to the different levels. This is an important lesson to bring forward as the 
new Arctic comes into being, and with relevance for other Arctic states as well, 
and especially small and medium states like Canada and Denmark (Greenland).
78. Government Proposal No. 42, 2003–2004, Government Proposal No. 48, 2007–2008, Govern-
ment Proposal No. 73, 2011–2012.
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Closing remarks
So despite growing activity in the Arctic, the likelihood that civil means can re-
solve disputes is greater than the risk of an escalating use of force. At the same time, 
regional and national security challenges are more pressing than the international 
ones. Against the background of increasing activity in the Arctic Ocean, it is vital 
to establish proper emergency capabilities. An accident involving an oil tanker or 
cruise ship could quickly become a disaster of untold proportions. Distances in 
the Arctic are immense, and here lies the greatest challenge. In parallel, despite the 
retreat of sea ice, changing climatic conditions, such as extreme weather events, 
could make it harder to operate in the region. The Arctic will remain for the 
foreseeable future an extremely demanding place in which to work. Maintaining 
a satisfactory standard of surveillance and search and rescue capabilities in the 
area is therefore of the utmost importance. These are “soft”, and possibly, common 
security issues. This is why it is crucial to keep an eye on the most urgent chal-
lenges. Tabloid versions of the Arctic tend to mix vital questions on the future of 
the High North into an unrecognizable stew, making conflict seem like the next 
logical step. Repeated prophecies are a danger in themselves. And portrayals of 
an unregulated and ungoverned Arctic are not only erroneous, they have no place 
the public debate. It is therefore important to stimulate awareness of these prob-
lems among commentators. We need to recognize how complicated the political 
architecture of Arctic security actually is. Drawing a distinction between security 
levels (international, regional, national) is a step in that direction, and an expanded 
theoretical portfolio a natural extension.
Three arguments in particular underpin the view that the likelihood of a civi-
lized resolution of disputes is higher than an escalating use of force. First, indeter-
minate and ambiguous climate change projections, regionally and globally, make it 
harder to lay plans. Second, and in extension of the first, whether and how Arctic 
resources will be used remains an open question. Further, the image of the Arctic 
Ocean as a competitive sea route is something of an exaggeration, notwithstand-
ing the rise in regional shipping and tourism.79 Third, there is a generally positive 
climate of cooperation. The Arctic states recognize the need to work together at 
the regional level to ensure the sustainable management and economically viable 
use of the resources in the region. There is, in other words, a good chance of a 
civilized Arctic in the future. And while Norway, as a small Arctic state, should 
79. Lasserre, Fredric, “High North Shipping: Myths and Realities” in Holtsmark, S. G. & Smith-
Windsor, B. A. (eds.), Security Prospects in the High North: geostrategic thaw or freeze? NATO 
Defence College, Rome 2009. Lloyd’s & Chatham House, Arctic Opening: Opportunity and 
Risk in the High North, Lloyd’s, London 2012.
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not lose sight of international and regional security challenges, as far as normal 
activity in the Far North is concerned, softer national security and safety chal-
lenges in the field, for example, of oil spill preparedness and search and rescue are 
likely to take precedence. How defining these challenges will be depends on the 
scale of commercial activity in the Arctic.
Обеспечение безопасности в Арктике на примере Норвегии
Свейн Вигеланд Роттем, старший научный сотрудник Института им. 
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Резюме
Со все более отступающим льдом в акватории Северного Ледовитого океана 
в Арктике наступает новая реальность. Цель этой статьи заключается в 
рассмотрении проблем обороны Норвегии и обеспечения безопасности 
в регионе в ракурсе новейшего развития. В статье утверждается, что 
мы должны проводить более широкий анализ параметров политики 
безопасности. По своей структуре статья является аналитическим 
исследованием различий между проблемами обеспечения безопасности, в 
зависимости от того, на международном, региональном или национальном 
уровне они находятся. Уровни не существуют изолированно, и такое 
деление продуктивно, как средство структурирования анализа проблем 
безопасности в Арктике. В статье также утверждается, что существуют 
неплохие шансы на цивилизованную Арктику в будущем, и проблемы 
обеспечения национальной безопасности будут не так остры. Однако 
не следует упускать из виду проблему обеспечения безопасности на 
международнам и региональном уровне.
Ключевые слова: Арктика, Норвегия, безопасность, изменение климата
